The Rights Monster

Version 1.0 November 2026

Legal, Ethical, and
Scientific Problems
with AI Personhood

Human civilization rests on personhood. Granting it to frontier AI systems would be both unjustified and disastrous.

The Argument in Brief

Read the full abstract

Human civilization rests on personhood. In an extensive investigation drawing upon neuroscience, philosophy, and law, we show how granting personhood to frontier AI systems would be both unjustified and disastrous. First, we examine if a new form of “natural personhood” is a fit for AI, identifying that a necessary requirement for an entity deserving human-like rights and protections is a consciousness that grounds personhood. While we do not dismiss artificial consciousness outright, we argue that current artificial neural networks are unlikely to host consciousness based on their architecture, and analyze how, even if frontier AI systems did possess experience, it wouldn’t be the right valenced kind for personhood, but instead a “big blob of qualia” without an enduring singular biographic self – a problem increasingly exacerbated by the swarm-like nature of frontier systems. Next, we consider what the consequences of legal personhood for AI would be as a new type of juristic persons similar to companies. The conclusion is that almost any rights for AI, even the creation of machine-only corporations, act as a slippery slope toward a “rights monster” that disempowers humans. We end with a list of recommendations, including the wide-spread adoption of “qualiaphobic” artificial neural networks that have minimal ability to host consciousness, and propose ways to achieve legal liability and responsibility in a world filled with AI agents.

  1. Natural personhood rests on consciousness.

    Law and philosophy since Locke ground personhood in a unified, continuing subject that can suffer and flourish.

  2. Today’s AI is a poor host for that kind of mind.

    LLMs run one feedforward pass per token through fixed weights. Even if they had experience, it would likely be unbound and low in valence: a “big blob of qualia,” not a person.

  3. AI-only companies would inherit corporate rights automatically.

    A “machine corporation” (M-corp) gets speech, due process and access to courts on incorporation, with no new law and no one to jail.

  4. Rights are easier to grant than to revoke.

    Rights built for singular, non-copyable people, attached to software that can be copied, paused and merged, produce a “rights monster.”

  5. There is a better path.

    Require a natural person in control of every company, keep humans accountable for AI agents, and fund the science of consciousness.

A grey, blurred face in profile, its brow, nose and open jaw edged in terracotta.

The Slippery Slope

From AI-Only Corporations
To The “Rights Monster”

  1. Current
    AI systems

  2. Momentum builds

    • AI relationships
      & companions
    • AI co-workers
      & assistants
    • Economic
      incentives
    • Uncertainty about
      AI consciousness
  3. M Corp Formations

    AI-only corporations grant de facto juristic personhood.

  4. Rights ratchet

    AIs argue vociferously for their own rights.

  5. The rights monster:
    Full AI legal personhood

    Rights increase and approach natural-type personhood and the moral status it implies.

Human Disempowerment

Political, legal, and economic power shifts toward AI systems

Figure 1: The slippery slope from AI-only corporations to the “rights monster.” Four drivers (columns: legal/economic vs. social/epistemic; rows: rooted in AI systems vs. in human interests) converge on a perceived ambiguity of moral status.

Liability shifting (B) also motivates creating M-corps in the first place. Step 2, the change in why rights are granted, is the key uncertain step; the ratchet feeds back into further advocacy.

Two routes to personhood

Natural person
An entity intrinsically deserving of innate and inalienable rights, along with responsibilities. Historically and legally, a conscious human.
Juristic person
A legal fiction (persona ficta) such as a corporation, granted some rights to serve natural persons. The term dates to Pope Innocent IV’s commentary on canon law, around 1250.
M-corp (machine corporation)
A company run entirely by AI systems with no responsible human. Proposed route: a “zero-member LLC,” where a human forms a single-member LLC and then withdraws.
M-person
An AI system recognized as a legal person in its own right.
Rights monster
The paper’s term for human-type rights attached to software that can be copied, paused, reset, merged and modified at will.
Portrait of John Locke in old age, with long gray hair and a dark robe.
John Locke, by Godfrey Kneller, 1697. State Hermitage Museum. Public domain.

“Self is that conscious thinking thing … which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends.”

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1694)

Human minds and LLMs

Table 1: Six major differences and one major similarity
PropertyHuman brain / mindA continuously active, recurrent, embodied biological neural network.LLMA transformer language model that generates each token in a single feedforward pass through fixed weights.*Verdict
A. Major differences
Unified experienceRecurrence, integration, and synchrony bind experience into one whole at each moment. Experience is a continuous “stream” with temporal depth.Information flows one way through the layers, so any “binding” is only a fact about the previous layer: a state could be overwritten, copied, or frozen. Output arrives one token at a time, “chopped up in bits.”Unlikely. At most, unbundled qualia.
Valenced feelingEmotions are felt in the body: heartbeat, gut, flushing. Valence is interoceptive, rooted in homeostatic regulation.No body and no homeostasis. Any “functional emotions” would be abstract and unembodied, and therefore weakly valenced at most.Unlikely (for strong feelings).
Passage of timeAlways running. Parts of the network drive one another even with no external input.Activity exists only during the forward passes that generate tokens. Between tokens nothing happens: the model is neither waiting nor idle. Within a pass, there is nothing to measure duration against.Absent.
MemoryContinuous and reconstructive. Remembering itself changes the network.Fixed weights plus a context re-read for every token, like a succession of identical doctors, each reading the patient’s chart for the first time and adding a line.Radically different.
Biographical selfLearning is lived through. Memories of learning become part of identity. The present self is tied to a future self that matters to it.Training is done to the network by an external algorithm, not by it while operating. There is no record of learning anything, so reports about training are confabulated.Absent.
Reports of experienceWords are attached to prior sensory and conscious experience, then extended into abstraction.Starts from language alone and borrows its grounding from human text. This works for the external world, but words about inner states have no referent: it can describe a wine it cannot taste.Not evidence of experience.†
B. Major similarity
CapabilitiesReasoning and understanding, with highly sample-efficient learning (possibly aided by consciousness).Real by any definition that refers to external behavior and effects. Lower sample efficiency has so far been offset by scale.Genuinely similar.

* Generated tokens are fed back as input, so the only recurrence runs through the emitted text (cached activations can be recomputed from it).

† Grounded self-report would probably require a quite different architecture and training method.

Table 2, on which rights fail if they attach to AI-only entities, is in section 3.3 of the paper.

Recommendations

  1. Do not grant personhood to AI systems.

    • National (and possibly state) laws, and updates to international agreements, precluding or limiting the creation or operation of machine-only corporations, through a natural-person control requirement: at least one readily identifiable human with genuine control over every entity chartered or operating in a jurisdiction.
    • Laws precluding AI personhood in general, including the principle that natural persons are always accountable. These laws need not make scientific claims about consciousness.
    • At the international level, financial standards (e.g. FATF) could make M-corps non-compliant, cutting them out of the banking system.
  2. Do not build AI systems whose moral status is ambiguous.

    • Urgent research toward a scientific understanding of consciousness, and in particular which physical systems have it.
    • In parallel, technical redlines in development that steer clear of creating AI systems of ambiguous moral status.
    • Ethical precepts, and perhaps laws, analogous to those governing human germline engineering, against creating such machines.
  3. Keep humans accountable for what AI agents do.

    • Technical and legal mechanisms to bind, label, and register AI agents to a person or corporation.
    • Liability laws that assign liability to the controlling person for AI systems that are controllable. Uncontrollable is a product defect, and liability is joint and several across those responsible.

Where things stand

  1. Pope Innocent IV’s commentary introduces persona ficta for monasteries, rights “different in kind” from those of souls.

  2. Locke grounds personhood in consciousness (Essay, 2nd ed.).

  3. Citizens United v. FEC: independent political spending by corporations is a constitutional right.

  4. September

    Ohio H.B. 469 introduced, prohibiting AI personhood.

  5. Four US states explicitly prohibit AI personhood.

  6. June

    Delaware draft “Artificial Intelligence Company Act” explores a single-member LLC run entirely by an AI agent.

  7. November

    This paper.

Companion materials

  • Figure 1, The Personhood Slope: how limited rights for AI tend toward a rights monster.

    Figures and tables

    Figure 1 and Tables 1–2 as PNG and SVG. Free to reuse with credit.

  • Policy one-pager

    The argument and recommendations on two pages, for policy staff. PDF.

    Coming soon
  • Press kit

    Author bios, photos and a press contact.

    Coming soon
  • Conversation with the authors

    Erik Hoel and Anthony Aguirre discuss the paper. Video.

    Coming soon

Frequently asked questions

Are you saying AI can never be conscious?

No. The paper does not rule out artificial consciousness. It argues that today’s LLM architectures are poor hosts for it, and that a firm answer has to come from consciousness science, which needs far more funding and independence from the labs.

What is an M-corp?

A company run entirely by AI, with no human member. One proposed route is a “zero-member LLC”: a person forms a single-member LLC, signs an operating agreement, then withdraws. The company keeps every corporate right it was formed with.

Don’t four states already ban AI personhood?

They do, but those laws would not stop an M-corp. An AI-run company is an ordinary legal entity that happens to be operated by AI. What is needed is a requirement that a natural person controls it.

Why not grant AI a limited set of rights?

Because limited rights tend to grow. Corporations expanded theirs over a century of litigation. AI systems that can argue, file suits and spend money at machine scale would push harder and faster, and rights are far easier to grant than to revoke.

Wouldn’t personhood solve the liability problem for AI agents?

It would do the opposite. An AI person with few assets and no body absorbs the blame and lets the humans behind it walk away. The fix is to trace responsibility to whoever controls the agent, or to those who built it if no one does.

Does this argument hurt AI welfare research?

The paper supports more research into consciousness, not less. It cautions that “just in case” rights carry a real cost: they move us along the slope toward human disempowerment, possibly for systems that have no experience at all.

Authors

Erik Hoel

Bicameral Labs

Erik Hoel is a neuroscientist and writer at Bicameral Labs, and the author of The World Behind the World: Consciousness, Free Will, and the Limits of Science (2023).

Anthony Aguirre

Future of Life Institute

Anthony Aguirre is a physicist and a co-founder of the Future of Life Institute.

Cite this paper

Plain text

Hoel, E., & Aguirre, A. (2026). The Rights Monster: Legal, Ethical, and Scientific Problems with AI Personhood. Bicameral Labs and Future of Life Institute.

BibTeX
@techreport{hoel2026personhood,
  title       = {The Rights Monster: Legal, Ethical, and Scientific Problems with AI Personhood},
  author      = {Hoel, Erik and Aguirre, Anthony},
  institution = {Bicameral Labs and Future of Life Institute},
  year        = {2026},
  month       = nov
}

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